Managing Marketing Channel Opportunism: The Efficacy of Alternative Governance Mechanisms

James R. Brown, Chekitan S. Dev, Dong‐Jin Lee

Journal of Marketing · 2000 · 531 citations · 68 references

Concepts

TL;DR

The study investigates how ownership, transaction‑specific asset investment, and relational norms can mitigate opportunism in marketing channels, and how their combinations influence opportunistic behavior. The authors use the U.S. hotel industry as a case to assess the impact of ownership, transaction‑specific asset investment, and relational norms on opportunism.

Abstract

The authors examine three governance mechanisms according to how well they mitigate opportunism in marketing channels. Using the U.S. hotel industry as the research context, the authors investigate how opportunism is limited by (1) ownership, (2) investment in transaction-specific assets, and (3) norms of relational exchange. They also investigate how various combinations of these governance mechanisms affect opportunistic behavior in hotel channels. Overall, the results generally support emphasizing relational norms in managing opportunism in marketing channels. The results also indicate that opportunism can be exacerbated when ownership or investments in transaction-specific assets are accentuated as governance mechanisms.

References

68