Management Science · 2008 · 125 citations · 11 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsOperations ManagementAgency TheoryContract TheoryContractsAsymmetric InformationContract DesignContract ManagementInformation AsymmetryOptimal ContractingTransaction Cost EconomicsCall Center SupportContract Design Under Asymmetric InformationContracting EconomicsInformation Asymmetry EffectsInformation Asymmetry In ContractingInformation Asymmetry In ContractsOutsourcing ContractsService-level Agreements
In this paper, we examine contracts to coordinate the capacity decision of a vendor who has been hired by a client to provide call center support. We consider a variety of contracts, all based on our observations of contracts used by one large vendor. We examine the role of different contract features such as pay-per-time, pay-per-call, service-level agreements, and constraints on service rates and abandonment. We show how different combinations of these contract features enable client firms to better manage vendors when there is information asymmetry about worker productivity. In particular, we focus on how different contracts can coordinate by yielding the system-optimal capacity decision by the vendor and consider how profits are allocated between the client and the vendor.
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Dimensioning Large Call Centers
Sem Borst, Avi Mandelbaum, Martin I. Reiman · Operations Research · 2004 · 355 citations
Gatekeepers and Referrals in Services
Robert A. Shumsky, Edieal J. Pinker · Management Science · 2003 · 197 citations