Contract Theory
Contract theory is an economic framework that analyzes the design of formal and informal contractual arrangements to address information asymmetry and align the incentives of principals and agents.
18.9K
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1.5M
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2017–2026
3.3K
18.9K
Separation of Ownership and Control
Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1983 · 19.1K citations
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Eugene F. Fama · Journal of Political Economy · 1980 · 10.6K citations
Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity
Douglas W. Diamond, Philip H. Dybvig · Journal of Political Economy · 1983 · 9.4K citations · Full text
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University of California, Berkeley, United States
32 publications · 32.8K citations
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University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
99 h-index
347 publications
87K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
95 h-index
305 publications
57.3K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
88 h-index
348 publications
35.6K citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
88 h-index
511 publications
51.9K citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
85 h-index
262 publications
77.3K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
85 h-index
375 publications
45.9K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
68 h-index
206 publications
34.8K citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
66 h-index
235 publications
28.9K citations
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279 publications · 37.9K citations
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163 publications · 40.7K citations
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See also Contract Theory | |
|---|---|
Core Models | |
Applications | Insurance Corporate Governance Federated Learning Labor Employment Contracts Financial Markets |
Variants | Incomplete Contract Theory Relational Contract Theory Incentive Compatibility Repeated Contracting Buy-back Agreements Revenue Sharing Contracts |
Key Assumptions | Information Asymmetry Moral Hazard Adverse Selection Bounded Rationality |
Limitations | Information Asymmetry Incomplete Contract Theory Analytical Solutions |