Repeated Contracting is a theoretical framework within incentive schemes that models the ongoing relationship between principals and agents through sequential, interdependent agreements, distinguished from one-shot contracts by its emphasis on reputation formation, dynamic incentives, and long-term compliance enforcement.
37
Publications
4.5K
Citations
55
Authors
53
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
1
Parents
Publications
37
Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships
David E. M. Sappington · The Journal of Economic Perspectives · 1991 · 845 citations · Full text
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Stephen E. Spear, Sanjay Srivastava · The Review of Economic Studies · 1987 · 650 citations
Business, Economics, Agency Theory +14
1–5 of 37
Authors
55
- WB
3
h-index
- GS
2
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- MD
2
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- MK
2
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- KS
2
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1–5 of 55
Institutions
53
Columbia University
New York, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
135 citations
Stockholm School of Economics
Stockholm, Sweden
3 h-index
3 publications
95 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
24 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
33 citations
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
468 citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
2 h-index
2 publications
85 citations
National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
55 citations
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
232 citations
1–8 of 53
Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 8 publications · 218 citations
8
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- Econometrica
3 publications · 1.2K citations
3
h-index
- The Journal of Law Economics and Organization
LEO · 3 publications · 304 citations
3
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- The RAND Journal of Economics
2 publications · 85 citations
2
h-index
- Games and Economic Behavior
2 publications · 131 citations
2
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1–5