Incentive Schemes

Incentive Schemes is a contractual mechanism in principal–agent models that specifies how an agent’s monetary or utility payoffs are contingent on observable outcomes or performance measures so as to align the agent’s privately chosen actions with the principal’s objectives under asymmetric information.

3.7K

Publications

291.3K

Citations

6.5K

Authors

1.8K

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

915

Authors

6.5K

  1. JH
    Jianwei Huang

    Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong SAR China

    21 publications · 1.7K citations

    19

    h-index

  2. DN
    Dusit Niyato

    Nanyang Technological University, Singapore

    22 publications · 2.7K citations

    19

    h-index

  3. ZH
    Zhu Han

    University of Houston, United States

    28 publications · 1.4K citations

    19

    h-index

  4. DY
    Dejun Yang

    Colorado School of Mines, United States

    21 publications · 2.4K citations

    18

    h-index

  5. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    19 publications · 6K citations

    18

    h-index

1–5 of 6.5K

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 283 publications · 11.2K citations

    55

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    79 publications · 5.9K citations

    42

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    52 publications · 13.3K citations

    39

    h-index

  4. The RAND Journal of Economics

    56 publications · 9.3K citations

    39

    h-index

  5. The Review of Economic Studies

    51 publications · 12.7K citations

    38

    h-index

1–5