Multitask Incentives

Multitask Incentives is a theoretical framework in agency theory that governs the design of incentive contracts when agents allocate effort across multiple tasks, distinguished by its focus on the trade-offs and distortions arising when performance measurement and rewards on one task affect effort allocation on others.

51

Publications

3.6K

Citations

90

Authors

93

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

9

Authors

90

  1. DM
    David Martimort

    Paris School of Economics, France

    3 publications · 501 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. CB
    Chong‐En Bai

    Tsinghua University, China

    3 publications · 120 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. EI
    Elisabetta Iossa

    University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy

    3 publications · 501 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. JA
    John A. List

    University of Chicago, United States

    2 publications · 78 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. HG
    Hans Gersbach

    ETH Zurich, Switzerland

    2 publications · 24 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 90

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 8 publications · 365 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    6 publications · 117 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. International Economic Review

    3 publications · 215 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. Information Systems Research

    ISR · 2 publications · 111 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Journal of Management Accounting Research

    JMAR · 2 publications · 95 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5