Optimal Incentive Contracts
Optimal Incentive Contracts is a theoretical framework in contract theory that specifies the most efficient contractual arrangement between a principal and an agent, designed to align the agent's actions with the principal's objectives under conditions of asymmetric information, risk, and moral hazard.
733
Publications
73.7K
Citations
1.1K
Authors
565
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
118
Parents
733
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Edward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen · Journal of Political Economy · 1981 · 4.6K citations · Full text
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
Douglas Gale, Martin Hellwig · The Review of Economic Studies · 1985 · 1.8K citations
Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature
Paul Klemperer · Journal of Economic Surveys · 1999 · 1.4K citations
Relational Incentive Contracts
Jonathan Levin · American Economic Review · 2003 · 1.1K citations
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565
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
21 h-index
37 publications
10.3K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
21 h-index
24 publications
4.3K citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
19 h-index
32 publications
1.6K citations
IZA - Institute of Labor Economics
Bonn, Germany
17 h-index
22 publications
5.8K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
17 h-index
24 publications
2.4K citations

National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
17 h-index
29 publications
6.7K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
15 h-index
20 publications
6K citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
15 h-index
29 publications
1.1K citations
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Repository · 105 publications · 3.7K citations
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38 publications · 3.6K citations
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37 publications · 3K citations
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23 publications · 5.6K citations
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24 publications · 5.6K citations
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