Optimal Incentive Contracts

Optimal Incentive Contracts is a theoretical framework in contract theory that specifies the most efficient contractual arrangement between a principal and an agent, designed to align the agent's actions with the principal's objectives under conditions of asymmetric information, risk, and moral hazard.

733

Publications

73.7K

Citations

1.1K

Authors

565

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

118

Authors

1.1K

  1. PM
    Peter M. DeMarzo

    National Bureau of Economic Research, United States

    8 publications · 682 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. DE
    David E. M. Sappington

    University of Florida, United States

    8 publications · 1.6K citations

    8

    h-index

  3. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    8 publications · 1.3K citations

    8

    h-index

  4. JT
    Jean Tirole

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    8 publications · 1.7K citations

    8

    h-index

  5. JL
    Jean‐Jacques Laffont

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    7 publications · 1.2K citations

    7

    h-index

1–5 of 1.1K

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 105 publications · 3.7K citations

    33

    h-index

  2. The RAND Journal of Economics

    38 publications · 3.6K citations

    28

    h-index

  3. Management Science

    37 publications · 3K citations

    26

    h-index

  4. American Economic Review

    23 publications · 5.6K citations

    21

    h-index

  5. The Review of Economic Studies

    24 publications · 5.6K citations

    21

    h-index

1–5