Incentive Compatibility

Incentive Compatibility is a property of a mechanism or contract in contract theory whereby, given agents’ private information and rational self-interest, each agent’s utility-maximizing strategy coincides with the behavior (such as truthful information revelation or prescribed action choice) intended by the designer.

2.7K

Publications

220.2K

Citations

4.4K

Authors

1.4K

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

515

Authors

4.4K

  1. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    21 publications · 7.7K citations

    18

    h-index

  2. FK
    Fuhito Kojima

    Stanford University, United States

    15 publications · 1.2K citations

    14

    h-index

  3. DC
    David C. Parkes

    Harvard University Press, United States

    14 publications · 463 citations

    13

    h-index

  4. AE
    Alvin E. Roth

    Stanford University, United States

    12 publications · 1.9K citations

    11

    h-index

  5. DE
    David E. M. Sappington

    University of Florida, United States

    11 publications · 1.3K citations

    11

    h-index

1–5 of 4.4K

Venues

  1. Econometrica

    78 publications · 16K citations

    52

    h-index

  2. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 100 publications · 9K citations

    41

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    55 publications · 17.7K citations

    40

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 190 publications · 6.6K citations

    40

    h-index

  5. Management Science

    52 publications · 5.2K citations

    35

    h-index

1–5