Menu Auctions
Menu Auctions is a theoretical framework in mechanism design that distinguishes itself by enabling agents to select from a menu of action-contingent contracts, thereby ensuring incentive compatibility through strategic revelation of private information in environments with interdependent valuations.
16
Publications
1.9K
Citations
20
Authors
18
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
4
Parents
16
The menu-size complexity of auctions
Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan · 2013 · 106 citations
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction
Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah et al. · 2012 · 89 citations
Business, Economics, Mathematics +11
Auctions and Contract Enforcement
Daniel F. Spulber · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · 1990 · 77 citations
Business, Contract Law, Economics +16
1–5 of 16
20
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18
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
4 h-index
7 publications
190 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
3 h-index
5 publications
307 citations
Microsoft (Israel)
Herzliya, Israel
2 h-index
4 publications
156 citations

Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
115 citations
Microsoft (United States)
Redmond, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
136 citations
Hebrew College
Brookline, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
136 citations
University of Maryland, College Park
College Park, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
115 citations
IIT@MIT
Cambridge, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
115 citations
1–8 of 18
JET · 2 publications · 47 citations
2
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2 publications · 71 citations
2
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Repository · 1 publications · 26 citations
1
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LEO · 1 publications · 77 citations
1
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QJE · 1 publications · 1.3K citations
1
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