Menu Auctions

Menu Auctions is a theoretical framework in mechanism design that distinguishes itself by enabling agents to select from a menu of action-contingent contracts, thereby ensuring incentive compatibility through strategic revelation of private information in environments with interdependent valuations.

16

Publications

1.9K

Citations

20

Authors

18

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

4

Authors

20

  1. NN
    Noam Nisan

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    4 publications · 196 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. YA
    Yannai A. Gonczarowski

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    3 publications · 84 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. SH
    Sergiu Hart

    Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    2 publications · 136 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. NH
    Nima Haghpanah

    Northwestern University, United States

    2 publications · 115 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. MB
    Moshe Babaioff

    Microsoft (United States), United States

    2 publications · 60 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 20

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 2 publications · 47 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Games and Economic Behavior

    2 publications · 71 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. arXiv (Cornell University)

    Repository · 1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. The Journal of Law Economics and Organization

    LEO · 1 publications · 77 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. The Quarterly Journal of Economics

    QJE · 1 publications · 1.3K citations

    1

    h-index

1–5