Bayesian Incentive Compatibility is a solution concept in mechanism design requiring that each agent’s expected utility, given their private information and beliefs about others’ types, is maximized by truthfully reporting their type under a Bayesian equilibrium.
98
Publications
10K
Citations
177
Authors
94
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
15
Variants
Bic
Parents
Publications
98
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Roger B. Myerson · Econometrica · 1979 · 2K citations
Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow · American Economic Review · 2011 · 1.9K citations
1–5 of 98
Authors
177
- SM
7
h-index
- JD
5
h-index
- YC
5
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- CD
4
h-index
- DM
3
h-index
1–5 of 177
Institutions
94
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
7 h-index
8 publications
358 citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
7 h-index
7 publications
284 citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
6 h-index
11 publications
234 citations
Microsoft (United States)
Redmond, United States
6 h-index
9 publications
370 citations
Indian Statistical Institute
Kolkata, India
5 h-index
6 publications
505 citations
Tsinghua University
Beijing, China
5 h-index
12 publications
321 citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
170 citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
4 h-index
4 publications
238 citations
1–8 of 94
Venues
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
Repository · 9 publications · 329 citations
9
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- Econometrica
7 publications · 2.6K citations
7
h-index
- Journal of Economic Theory
JET · 6 publications · 404 citations
6
h-index
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 4 publications · 524 citations
4
h-index
- American Economic Review
3 publications · 1.9K citations
3
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1–5