American Economic Review · 2011 · 1.9K citations · 22 references
Social SciencesEconomicsGame TheoryInformation TheoryPersuasionAsymmetric InformationBayesian GamesBehavioral Game TheoryIncentive CompatibilityInformation AsymmetrySignaling GamesBayesian Incentive CompatibilityBayesian Mechanism DesignExistence Of Comparative StaticsPersuasion In LobbyingSender-receiver GamesSignaling In BargainingSignaling Under Incomplete InformationSymmetric Information Exchange
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a signal that strictly benefits the sender. We characterize sender-optimal signals. We examine comparative statics with respect to the alignment of the sender's and the receiver's preferences. Finally, we apply our results to persuasion by litigators, lobbyists, and salespeople. (JEL D72, D82, D83, K40, M31)
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Michael Spence · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1973 · 15.2K citations
Robert Moffitt · American Economic Review · 2009 · 4.7K citations
Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel · Econometrica · 1982 · 4.4K citations