Sender-receiver Games
Sender-Receiver Games is a signaling game in which one rational agent (the sender) possesses private information and strategically transmits a signal to another rational agent (the receiver), who then updates beliefs and takes an action based on that signal to maximize expected utility, thus modeling the strategic transmission and interpretation of information under uncertainty.
183
Publications
16.8K
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281
Authors
189
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
51
Parents
183
Strategic Information Transmission
Vincent P. Crawford, Joel Sobel · Econometrica · 1982 · 4.4K citations
Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow · American Economic Review · 2011 · 1.9K citations
Meaning and Credibility in Cheap-Talk Games
Joseph Farrell · Games and Economic Behavior · 1993 · 522 citations
MultipleReferralsandMultidimensionalCheapTalk
2011 · 515 citations
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University of California, Irvine
Irvine, United States
8 h-index
9 publications
593 citations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, United States
7 h-index
7 publications
322 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
6 h-index
10 publications
395 citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
6 h-index
8 publications
4.2K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
6 h-index
6 publications
859 citations

Bocconi University
Milan, Italy
5 h-index
5 publications
121 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
5 h-index
7 publications
287 citations

Middlesex University
London, United Kingdom
5 h-index
5 publications
304 citations
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Repository · 15 publications · 621 citations
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16 publications · 1.6K citations
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JET · 11 publications · 717 citations
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7 publications · 5.2K citations
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Repository · 6 publications · 139 citations
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