Sender-receiver Games

Sender-Receiver Games is a signaling game in which one rational agent (the sender) possesses private information and strategically transmits a signal to another rational agent (the receiver), who then updates beliefs and takes an action based on that signal to maximize expected utility, thus modeling the strategic transmission and interpretation of information under uncertainty.

183

Publications

16.8K

Citations

281

Authors

189

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

51

Authors

281

  1. AB
    Andreas Blume

    University of Pittsburgh, United States

    7 publications · 265 citations

    7

    h-index

  2. VC
    Valerio Capraro

    Middlesex University, United Kingdom

    5 publications · 219 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. MM
    Manolo Martínez

    Universitat de Barcelona, Spain

    4 publications · 93 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. JT
    Joseph Tao‐yi Wang

    National Taiwan University, Taiwan

    4 publications · 896 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. RA
    Rufus A. Johnstone

    University of Cambridge, United Kingdom

    4 publications · 122 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 281

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 15 publications · 621 citations

    13

    h-index

  2. Games and Economic Behavior

    16 publications · 1.6K citations

    13

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 11 publications · 717 citations

    11

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    7 publications · 5.2K citations

    7

    h-index

  5. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 6 publications · 139 citations

    6

    h-index

1–5