Signaling Games

Signaling Games is a class of two-player dynamic Bayesian games of incomplete information in which one informed player (the sender) observes a private type and chooses a type-contingent signal, after which an uninformed player (the receiver) observes the signal and chooses a signal-contingent action, with both players’ payoffs depending on the sender’s type, the signal sent, and the receiver’s action.

580

Publications

44.8K

Citations

927

Authors

511

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

135

Authors

927

  1. DF
    Drew Fudenberg

    Harvard University, United States

    10 publications · 444 citations

    10

    h-index

  2. MT
    Milind Tambe

    University of Southern California, United States

    8 publications · 423 citations

    8

    h-index

  3. DJ
    David J. Cooper

    Florida State University, United States

    7 publications · 949 citations

    7

    h-index

  4. BS
    Brian Skyrms

    University of California, Irvine, United States

    7 publications · 388 citations

    7

    h-index

  5. SM
    Simon M. Huttegger

    University of California, Irvine, United States

    7 publications · 702 citations

    7

    h-index

1–5 of 927

Venues

  1. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 27 publications · 2.8K citations

    23

    h-index

  2. Games and Economic Behavior

    35 publications · 2K citations

    21

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 37 publications · 965 citations

    20

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    18 publications · 3K citations

    17

    h-index

  5. Journal of Theoretical Biology

    12 publications · 1.6K citations

    11

    h-index

1–5