Evolutionary Signaling
Evolutionary Signaling is a theoretical framework within signaling games that models the emergence and stability of signaling systems through natural selection, distinguishing itself by explaining how honest signaling can evolve and persist in populations over time without requiring intentional rationality.
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5K
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118
Authors
85
Institutions
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2017–2026
11
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Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling
Simon M. Huttegger, Brian Skyrms, Rory Smead et al. · Synthese · 2009 · 124 citations · Full text
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University of California, Irvine
Irvine, United States
5 h-index
8 publications
677 citations
Indiana University Bloomington
Bloomington, United States
4 h-index
9 publications
310 citations

Indiana State University
Terre Haute, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
97 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
3 h-index
7 publications
398 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
538 citations
École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne
Lausanne, Switzerland
2 h-index
4 publications
208 citations
University of Illinois System
Urbana, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
52 citations
Max Planck Society
Munich, Germany
2 h-index
2 publications
28 citations
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9 publications · 318 citations
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PNAS · 5 publications · 377 citations
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4 publications · 240 citations
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4 publications · 225 citations
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3 publications · 70 citations
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