Evolutionary Signaling

Evolutionary Signaling is a theoretical framework within signaling games that models the emergence and stability of signaling systems through natural selection, distinguishing itself by explaining how honest signaling can evolve and persist in populations over time without requiring intentional rationality.

63

Publications

5K

Citations

118

Authors

85

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

11

Authors

118

  1. BS
    Brian Skyrms

    University of California, Irvine, United States

    3 publications · 279 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. AG
    Alison G. Ossip-Klein

    Indiana University Bloomington, United States

    2 publications · 67 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. DJ
    Dustin J. Penn

    University of Veterinary Medicine Vienna, Austria

    2 publications · 138 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MS
    Marian Stamp Dawkins

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 125 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. AJ
    Arthur J. Robson

    Western University, Canada

    2 publications · 297 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 118

Venues

  1. Evolution

    9 publications · 318 citations

    9

    h-index

  2. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

    PNAS · 5 publications · 377 citations

    5

    h-index

  3. 4

    h-index

  4. Philosophy of Science

    4 publications · 225 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Animal Behaviour

    3 publications · 70 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5