Repeated Signaling

Repeated Signaling is a dynamic signaling game framework in which sequential interactions between sender and receiver occur over multiple rounds, enabling the sender to repeatedly transmit signals about a fixed or evolving state and allowing for the updating of beliefs and strategies through learning or reputation effects.

9

Publications

340

Citations

18

Authors

11

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

0

Authors

18

  1. MB
    Mark Briffa

    University of Plymouth, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 111 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. KH
    Kim H. Harris

    University of Alberta, Canada

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. DK
    David K. Levine

    Washington University in St. Louis, United States

    1 publications · 49 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. JH
    James H. Chin

    University of Alberta, Canada

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. MG
    Marco Grillo

    Science for Life Laboratory, Sweden

    1 publications · 42 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 18

Venues

  1. Behavioral Ecology

    2 publications · 111 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. The Quarterly Journal of Economics

    QJE · 1 publications · 49 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Brain Cell Biology

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. International Economic Review

    1 publications · 28 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Games and Economic Behavior

    1 publications · 15 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5