Contract Design

Contract Design is a subfield of contract and agency theory that studies and prescribes the optimal structure and content of contractual arrangements—specifying rights, obligations, incentives, control and enforcement mechanisms—under given informational, institutional, and transactional constraints, in order to align parties’ interests and allocate risks in settings including international joint ventures.

3.3K

Publications

288.6K

Citations

5K

Authors

1.6K

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

584

Authors

5K

  1. RE
    Robert E. Scott

    Mayo Clinic, United States

    20 publications · 1.8K citations

    18

    h-index

  2. OH
    Oliver Hart

    Harvard University, United States

    18 publications · 17.1K citations

    16

    h-index

  3. YC
    Yongqiang Chen

    Tianjin University, China

    12 publications · 750 citations

    13

    h-index

  4. IH
    Islam H. El-adaway

    Missouri University of Science and Technology, United States

    13 publications · 331 citations

    12

    h-index

  5. DM
    David Martimort

    Paris School of Economics, France

    11 publications · 801 citations

    11

    h-index

1–5 of 5K

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 254 publications · 10.7K citations

    51

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    53 publications · 7.9K citations

    40

    h-index

  3. 34

    h-index

  4. American Economic Review

    41 publications · 10.2K citations

    33

    h-index

  5. European Journal of Operational Research

    50 publications · 2.9K citations

    30

    h-index

1–5