Contract Design
Contract Design is a subfield of contract and agency theory that studies and prescribes the optimal structure and content of contractual arrangements—specifying rights, obligations, incentives, control and enforcement mechanisms—under given informational, institutional, and transactional constraints, in order to align parties’ interests and allocate risks in settings including international joint ventures.
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2017–2026
584
3.3K
Separation of Ownership and Control
Eugene F. Fama, Michael C. Jensen · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1983 · 19.1K citations
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Missouri University of Science and Technology, United States
13 publications · 331 citations
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National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
37 h-index
78 publications
7.1K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
32 h-index
55 publications
7.5K citations

University of Hong Kong
Pok Fu Lam, Hong Kong
30 h-index
60 publications
4.3K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
30 h-index
53 publications
6.3K citations

Hong Kong Polytechnic University
Hong Kong, Hong Kong
29 h-index
64 publications
4.5K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
29 h-index
57 publications
11.5K citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
28 h-index
42 publications
7.5K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
27 h-index
50 publications
5.6K citations
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Repository · 254 publications · 10.7K citations
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53 publications · 7.9K citations
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41 publications · 10.2K citations
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50 publications · 2.9K citations
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