Concepedia

Optimal Contracting

Optimal Contracting is a theoretical framework within contract theory that identifies the contract design which maximizes expected utility or efficiency under informational asymmetries, incentive constraints, and contractual incompleteness, distinguishing itself by characterizing the best feasible allocation of risks, incentives, and control rights among rational agents.

4.1K

Publications

374.7K

Citations

5.5K

Authors

1.7K

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

724

Parents

Children

Publications

4.1K

The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration

Sanford J. Grossman, Oliver Hart · Journal of Political Economy · 1986 · 9.5K citations · Full text

, , +16

Moral Hazard and Observability

Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations

, , +17

The economic institutions of capitalism firms, markets, relational contracting

Oliver E. Williamson · 1987 · 7.3K citations

, , +15

Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design

Bengt Holmström, Paul Milgrom · The Journal of Law Economics and Organization · 1991 · 6.1K citations

, , +14

Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process

Benjamin Klein, Robert Crawford, Armen A. Alchian · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1978 · 5.9K citations

, , +16

1–5 of 4.1K

Authors

5.5K

  1. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    25 publications · 6K citations

    22

    h-index

  2. DE
    David E. M. Sappington

    University of Florida, United States

    19 publications · 2.4K citations

    19

    h-index

  3. OH
    Oliver Hart

    Harvard University, United States

    22 publications · 18K citations

    19

    h-index

  4. DM
    David Martimort

    Paris School of Economics, France

    22 publications · 1.5K citations

    17

    h-index

  5. JL
    Jean‐Jacques Laffont

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    22 publications · 4K citations

    17

    h-index

1–5 of 5.5K

Institutions

1.7K

  1. Stanford University

    Stanford, United States

    59 h-index

    129 publications

    23.5K citations

  2. University of Chicago

    Chicago, United States

    50 h-index

    113 publications

    21.9K citations

  3. National Bureau of Economic Research

    Cambridge, United States

    47 h-index

    156 publications

    21.3K citations

  4. University of California, Berkeley

    Berkeley, United States

    45 h-index

    127 publications

    23.4K citations

  5. University of Pennsylvania

    Philadelphia, United States

    44 h-index

    115 publications

    14.9K citations

  6. Massachusetts Institute of Technology

    Cambridge, United States

    41 h-index

    88 publications

    32.5K citations

  7. The University of Texas at Austin

    Austin, United States

    36 h-index

    69 publications

    5.6K citations

  8. University of Michigan

    Ann Arbor, United States

    35 h-index

    82 publications

    5.7K citations

1–8 of 1.7K

Venues

  1. Management Science

    140 publications · 18.4K citations

    69

    h-index

  2. American Economic Review

    103 publications · 20.1K citations

    62

    h-index

  3. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 393 publications · 15.1K citations

    61

    h-index

  4. Econometrica

    82 publications · 20.8K citations

    54

    h-index

  5. The RAND Journal of Economics

    96 publications · 11.8K citations

    53

    h-index

1–5