Concepedia

Contract Design Under Commitment Constraints

Contract Design Under Commitment Constraints is a theoretical framework in optimal contracting that specifies how incentive-compatible agreements are structured when agents or principals face limitations in their ability to commit to future actions or transfers, distinguishing it from standard contract models by explicitly incorporating time-inconsistency and enforcement frictions into the design process.

29

Publications

1.2K

Citations

64

Authors

44

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Parents

Publications

29

A Principal-Agent Model for Product Specification and Production

Ananth V. Iyer, Leroy B. Schwarz, Stefanos Zenios · Management Science · 2005 · 157 citations

, , +17

International Investment Law Between Commitment and Flexibility: A Contract Theory Analysis

Anne van Aaken · Journal of International Economic Law · 2009 · 114 citations

, , +14

Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach

Tüomas Sandholm, Victor Lesser · Games and Economic Behavior · 2001 · 114 citations

, , +12

A Bargaining Model Based on the Commitment Tactic

Abhinay Muthoo · Journal of Economic Theory · 1996 · 101 citations

, , +11

Self Control and Liquidity: How to Design a Commitment Contract

John Beshears, James Choi, David Laibson et al. · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2011 · 79 citations · Full text

, , +10

1–5 of 29

Authors

64

  1. BC
    Brigitte C. Madrian

    Harvard University, United States

    2 publications · 101 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. QY
    Quan Yuan

    Zhejiang University, China

    2 publications · 27 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. JB
    John Beshears

    Harvard University, United States

    2 publications · 101 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MP
    Munindar P. Singh

    North Carolina State University, United States

    2 publications · 80 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. EJ
    Elizabeth J. Durango‐Cohen

    Illinois Institute of Technology, United States

    2 publications · 80 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 64

Institutions

44

  1. Harvard University

    Cambridge, United States

    3 h-index

    5 publications

    213 citations

  2. Yale University

    New Haven, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    101 citations

  3. City University of Hong Kong

    Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    2 h-index

    3 publications

    42 citations

  4. Carnegie Mellon University

    Pittsburgh, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    144 citations

  5. Illinois Institute of Technology

    Chicago, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    80 citations

  6. National Bureau of Economic Research

    Cambridge, United States

    2 h-index

    8 publications

    404 citations

  7. Chinese University of Hong Kong

    Hong Kong, Hong Kong

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    22 citations

  8. University of California, Berkeley

    Berkeley, United States

    2 h-index

    2 publications

    80 citations

1–8 of 44

Venues

  1. Production and Operations Management

    POMS · 3 publications · 38 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. Insurance Mathematics and Economics

    2 publications · 20 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Management Science

    2 publications · 226 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 1 publications · 79 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Marketing Research

    1 publications · 26 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5