Auction-based Contract Design

Auction-Based Contract Design is a formal framework within optimal contracting that uses auction mechanisms as the primary instrument for allocating contractual rights and specifying performance incentives, distinguished by its reliance on competitive bidding to elicit agent types and determine optimal contract terms under asymmetric information.

52

Publications

2.8K

Citations

128

Authors

77

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

12

Authors

128

  1. LB
    Luiz Barroso

    Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

    4 publications · 122 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. MW
    Marijke Welisch

    TU Wien, Austria

    2 publications · 87 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. HR
    Hugh Rudnick

    Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile

    2 publications · 35 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. RB
    Ricardo Buettner

    Hochschule Aalen, Germany

    2 publications · 48 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. MP
    M.V.F. Pereira

    Centro de Estudos e Pesquisa em Saúde Coletiva, Brazil

    2 publications · 87 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 128

Venues

  1. European Journal of Operational Research

    3 publications · 245 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. Production and Operations Management

    POMS · 3 publications · 118 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. 2

    h-index

  4. eScholarship (California Digital Library)

    Repository · 2 publications · 30 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. The RAND Journal of Economics

    2 publications · 392 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5