The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations · 14 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsContract LawAgency TheoryContract TheoryContractsInformation AsymmetryMoral HazardOptimal ContractingPrincipal-agent ProblemsPrincipal-agent RelationshipsPrincipal-agent TheoryContract Design Under Asymmetric InformationContract Design Under Moral HazardContracting Under Unobservable RiskImperfect Information GamesInformation Asymmetry In ContractingInformation Asymmetry In ContractsMoral Hazard AnalysisOptimal Contracting Theory
The role of imperfect information in a principal-agent relationship subject to moral hazard is considered. A necessary and sufficient condition for imperfect information to improve on contracts based on the payoff alone is derived, and a characterization of the optimal use of such information is given.
14
Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.
D. O’Brien, Oliver E. Williamson · The Economic Journal · 1976 · 13.8K citations
Optimization by Vector Space Methods
Students Quarterly Journal · 1970 · 6.1K citations
Natural Sciences, Industrial Engineering, Design Optimization +6
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Stephen A. Ross · American Economic Review · 1973 · 4.1K citations
Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing.
Nils H. Hakansson, Kenneth J. Arrow · The Journal of Finance · 1972 · 4.1K citations