Principal-agent Relationships
Principal-Agent Relationships is a theoretical framework in agency theory that models a contractual association in which one party, the principal, delegates decision-making authority to another party, the agent, who acts on the principal’s behalf under conditions of information asymmetry and potential misalignment of interests.
946
Publications
112.1K
Citations
1.4K
Authors
661
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
123
Variants
Principal Agent Relationships
Parents
946
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt · Academy of Management Review · 1989 · 9.4K citations
Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt · Academy of Management Review · 1989 · 5.9K citations
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Stephen A. Ross · American Economic Review · 1973 · 4.1K citations
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661
Arizona State University
Tempe, United States
18 h-index
23 publications
2.4K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
16 h-index
18 publications
3K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
15 h-index
19 publications
18.6K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
14 h-index
16 publications
2.4K citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
13 h-index
15 publications
595 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
13 h-index
19 publications
581 citations
University of Southern California
Los Angeles, United States
12 h-index
17 publications
1.2K citations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, United States
12 h-index
15 publications
645 citations
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Repository · 70 publications · 2.7K citations
28
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25 publications · 3.7K citations
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JET · 22 publications · 2.4K citations
20
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17 publications · 5.9K citations
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17 publications · 4.2K citations
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