Principal-agent Relationships

Principal-Agent Relationships is a theoretical framework in agency theory that models a contractual association in which one party, the principal, delegates decision-making authority to another party, the agent, who acts on the principal’s behalf under conditions of information asymmetry and potential misalignment of interests.

946

Publications

112.1K

Citations

1.4K

Authors

661

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

123

Authors

1.4K

  1. LR
    Luis R. Gómez‐Mejía

    Arizona State University, United States

    11 publications · 2.5K citations

    11

    h-index

  2. BM
    Barry M. Mitnick

    University of Pittsburgh, United States

    10 publications · 590 citations

    10

    h-index

  3. DM
    David Martimort

    Paris School of Economics, France

    9 publications · 539 citations

    9

    h-index

  4. GJ
    Gary J. Miller

    University of Colorado Health, United States

    7 publications · 1.3K citations

    7

    h-index

  5. JL
    Jean‐Jacques Laffont

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    6 publications · 1.6K citations

    6

    h-index

1–5 of 1.4K

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 70 publications · 2.7K citations

    28

    h-index

  2. The RAND Journal of Economics

    25 publications · 3.7K citations

    21

    h-index

  3. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 22 publications · 2.4K citations

    20

    h-index

  4. American Economic Review

    17 publications · 5.9K citations

    16

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    17 publications · 4.2K citations

    16

    h-index

1–5