Principal-agent Theory

Principal-Agent Theory is a foundational framework in Contract Theory that models the strategic interaction between two rational parties, where one party (the principal) delegates decision-making authority to another party (the agent) under conditions of information asymmetry, misaligned incentives, and contractual incompleteness.

1.2K

Publications

141.6K

Citations

1.7K

Authors

753

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

164

Authors

1.7K

  1. DM
    David Martimort

    Paris School of Economics, France

    16 publications · 1.3K citations

    14

    h-index

  2. DE
    David E. M. Sappington

    University of Florida, United States

    9 publications · 1.8K citations

    9

    h-index

  3. JL
    Jean‐Jacques Laffont

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    8 publications · 2K citations

    8

    h-index

  4. JT
    Jean Tirole

    Institut d'Économie Industrielle, France

    8 publications · 3.8K citations

    8

    h-index

  5. DM
    Dilip Mookherjee

    Boston University, United States

    8 publications · 1.1K citations

    8

    h-index

1–5 of 1.7K

Venues

  1. Econometrica

    42 publications · 16.1K citations

    37

    h-index

  2. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 109 publications · 3.7K citations

    32

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    36 publications · 11.3K citations

    29

    h-index

  4. The RAND Journal of Economics

    42 publications · 5.2K citations

    29

    h-index

  5. Journal of Economic Theory

    JET · 31 publications · 3.4K citations

    26

    h-index

1–5