Principal-agent Theory
Principal-Agent Theory is a foundational framework in Contract Theory that models the strategic interaction between two rational parties, where one party (the principal) delegates decision-making authority to another party (the agent) under conditions of information asymmetry, misaligned incentives, and contractual incompleteness.
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1.7K
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753
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2017–2026
164
1.2K
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt · Academy of Management Review · 1989 · 9.4K citations
Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Kathleen M. Eisenhardt · Academy of Management Review · 1989 · 5.9K citations
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem.
Stephen A. Ross · American Economic Review · 1973 · 4.1K citations
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Stanford University
Stanford, United States
23 h-index
32 publications
20.2K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
22 h-index
31 publications
3.6K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
21 h-index
34 publications
4.1K citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
17 h-index
31 publications
1.7K citations
Duke University
Durham, United States
16 h-index
20 publications
1.6K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
16 h-index
30 publications
2K citations
Centre for Economic Policy Research
London, United Kingdom
15 h-index
24 publications
888 citations
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
15 h-index
27 publications
1.6K citations
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42 publications · 16.1K citations
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Repository · 109 publications · 3.7K citations
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36 publications · 11.3K citations
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42 publications · 5.2K citations
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JET · 31 publications · 3.4K citations
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