Multiperiod Agency Models
Multiperiod Agency Models is a formal framework within principal-agent theory that extends static agency analysis by incorporating dynamic interactions over time, distinguishing itself through the explicit modeling of sequential decision-making, evolving information structures, and incentives that unfold across multiple periods.
43
Publications
4.6K
Citations
81
Authors
58
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
2
Variants
Dynamic Agency Models
Parents
43
On Repeated Moral Hazard with Discounting
Stephen E. Spear, Sanjay Srivastava · The Review of Economic Studies · 1987 · 650 citations
Business, Economics, Agency Theory +14
Audit Pricing and Independence.
Robert P. Magee, Mei‐Chiun Tseng · The Accounting Review · 1990 · 322 citations
Business, Accountancy, Agency Theory +11
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58
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
1.7K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
3 h-index
3 publications
830 citations
Princeton University
Princeton, United States
3 h-index
7 publications
1.8K citations
Indiana University Bloomington
Bloomington, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
102 citations
University of California, Los Angeles
Los Angeles, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
74 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
2 h-index
4 publications
1.1K citations
Arizona State University
Tempe, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
69 citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
2 h-index
3 publications
248 citations
1–8 of 58
Repository · 4 publications · 209 citations
4
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4 publications · 2.2K citations
4
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3 publications · 146 citations
3
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JET · 3 publications · 370 citations
3
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CJE · 2 publications · 104 citations
2
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1–5