Renegotiation-proof Contracts

Renegotiation-Proof Contracts is a contractual framework in the theory of incomplete contracts that is designed to be immune to mutually beneficial modifications after initial agreement, thereby ensuring that no party has an incentive to propose or accept a revision under asymmetric information, private values, or hold-up concerns.

86

Publications

8.4K

Citations

119

Authors

94

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Authors

119

  1. MR
    Michael R. Roberts

    University of Pennsylvania, United States

    4 publications · 1.5K citations

    4

    h-index

  2. DS
    Dirk Sliwka

    University of Cologne, Germany

    3 publications · 93 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. GN
    Georg Nöldeke

    University of Bonn, Germany

    3 publications · 500 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. KM
    Klaus M. Schmidt

    Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    3 publications · 500 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. BS
    Bruno Strulovici

    Northwestern University, United States

    3 publications · 55 citations

    3

    h-index

1–5 of 119

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 11 publications · 648 citations

    11

    h-index

  2. The RAND Journal of Economics

    6 publications · 688 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    6 publications · 1.2K citations

    6

    h-index

  4. The Review of Economic Studies

    5 publications · 1.4K citations

    5

    h-index

  5. Econometrica

    4 publications · 592 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5