Renegotiation-proof Contracts
Renegotiation-Proof Contracts is a contractual framework in the theory of incomplete contracts that is designed to be immune to mutually beneficial modifications after initial agreement, thereby ensuring that no party has an incentive to propose or accept a revision under asymmetric information, private values, or hold-up concerns.
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8.4K
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119
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94
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2017–2026
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86
Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting
Yeon‐Koo Che, Donald B. Hausch · American Economic Review · 1999 · 519 citations
Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
Oliver Hart, Jean Tirole · The Review of Economic Studies · 1988 · 449 citations
Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
Drew Fudenberg, Jean Tirole · Econometrica · 1990 · 441 citations
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National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
8 h-index
9 publications
1.1K citations
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
5 h-index
5 publications
1.6K citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
4 h-index
4 publications
1.1K citations
University of California San Diego
San Diego, United States
4 h-index
5 publications
198 citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
866 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
388 citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
3 h-index
3 publications
178 citations
Boston University
Boston, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
84 citations
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Repository · 11 publications · 648 citations
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6 publications · 688 citations
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6 publications · 1.2K citations
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5 publications · 1.4K citations
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4 publications · 592 citations
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