Journal of Economic Theory · 1984 · 321 citations · 16 references
BusinessEconomicsContract TheoryIncentive SystemsMicroeconomicsContract DesignIncentive CompatibilityIncentive SchemesInformation AsymmetryMechanism DesignOptimal ContractingIncentive ProvisionIncentive-compatible ContractsMulti-agent IncentivesOptimal Contracting TheoryOptimal Incentive Contracts
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
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Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
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Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
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