Incentive-Compatible Contracts is a contractual framework in insurance design that belongs to the class of optimal contract models and is distinguished by its property of aligning the interests of the insured and insurer such that truthful reporting and desired behavioral outcomes are achieved without external enforcement.
441
Publications
34.6K
Citations
862
Authors
443
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
90
Variants
Incentive Compatible Contracts
Parents
Publications
441
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Roger B. Myerson · Econometrica · 1979 · 2K citations
Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem
Douglas Gale, Martin Hellwig · The Review of Economic Studies · 1985 · 1.8K citations
1–5 of 441
Authors
862
- TS
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- SZ
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- GW
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- PW
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- DN
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1–5 of 862
Institutions
443
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, United States
20 h-index
29 publications
4.1K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
15 h-index
18 publications
841 citations
Yale University
New Haven, United States
12 h-index
12 publications
1.4K citations
New York University
New York, United States
12 h-index
16 publications
869 citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
10 h-index
13 publications
1.2K citations
Ifo Institute for Economic Research
Munich, Germany
9 h-index
10 publications
312 citations
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor, United States
9 h-index
9 publications
865 citations
National Bureau of Economic Research
Cambridge, United States
9 h-index
11 publications
826 citations
1–8 of 443
Venues
- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 45 publications · 1.8K citations
21
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- Management Science
16 publications · 1.7K citations
16
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- Econometrica
15 publications · 4.6K citations
14
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- The Review of Economic Studies
12 publications · 2.9K citations
12
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- The RAND Journal of Economics
11 publications · 909 citations
11
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1–5