Mechanism Design
Mechanism Design is a branch of economic theory within the broader field of game theory that focuses on designing institutions or rules of interaction to achieve desired economic outcomes under asymmetric information.
3.6K
Publications
231.7K
Citations
4.9K
Authors
1.5K
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
797
3.6K
The Handbook of experimental economics
Choice Reviews Online · 1995 · 3.7K citations
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
Roger B. Myerson, Mark A. Satterthwaite · Journal of Economic Theory · 1983 · 2.6K citations
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Roger B. Myerson · Econometrica · 1979 · 2K citations
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1.5K
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
51 h-index
152 publications
13.1K citations

Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
41 h-index
111 publications
9.9K citations
Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Jerusalem, Israel
40 h-index
105 publications
6.6K citations
Northwestern University
Evanston, United States
38 h-index
88 publications
11.5K citations
Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, United States
37 h-index
139 publications
10.7K citations
Harvard University
Cambridge, United States
34 h-index
86 publications
7.1K citations
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, United States
34 h-index
83 publications
9.7K citations
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, United States
32 h-index
66 publications
6.1K citations
1–8 of 1.5K
107 publications · 15.7K citations
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JET · 162 publications · 16.3K citations
55
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83 publications · 12K citations
54
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140 publications · 7.1K citations
47
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Repository · 233 publications · 8K citations
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