Combinatorial Auction Design

Combinatorial Auction Design is a mechanism design framework that enables bidders to place bids on combinations of discrete items or packages, rather than individual items alone, in order to address interdependencies in bidder valuations and achieve more efficient allocation outcomes in multi-item auctions.

137

Publications

8.8K

Citations

322

Authors

167

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

28

Authors

322

  1. TS
    Tüomas Sandholm

    Carnegie Mellon University, United States

    10 publications · 1.7K citations

    10

    h-index

  2. DC
    David C. Parkes

    Harvard University Press, United States

    8 publications · 649 citations

    8

    h-index

  3. MB
    Martin Bichler

    Technical University of Munich, Germany

    5 publications · 220 citations

    5

    h-index

  4. BL
    Benjamin Lubin

    Boston University, United States

    5 publications · 163 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. YN
    Y. Narahari

    Indian Institute of Science Bangalore, India

    4 publications · 84 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 322

Venues

  1. IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing

    TMCCI · 4 publications · 465 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Decision Support Systems

    4 publications · 62 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. 3

    h-index

  4. Management Science

    3 publications · 394 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. Artificial Intelligence

    3 publications · 1.1K citations

    3

    h-index

1–5