Menu Auction Design is a mechanism design framework in which an agent selects from a menu of outcome-payment pairs offered by a principal, distinguished by its use of screening through nonlinear pricing or allocation rules to elicit private information in adverse selection environments.
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1.5K
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5
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4
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2017–2026
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Publications
3
Lobbying and Welfare in a Representative Democracy
Tim Besley, Stephen Coate · The Review of Economic Studies · 2001 · 234 citations
Auction design in the presence of collusion
Gregory Pavlov · Econstor (Econstor) · 2008 · 43 citations · Full text
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Authors
5
- TBTim Besley
London School of Economics and Political Science, United Kingdom
1 publications · 234 citations
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1–5 of 5
Institutions
4
London School of Economics and Political Science
London, United Kingdom
1 h-index
1 publications
234 citations
Harvard University Press
Cambridge, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
1.3K citations
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
1.3K citations
Cornell University
Ithaca, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
234 citations
Paris School of Economics
Paris, France
1 publications
10 citations
University of Chicago
Chicago, United States
1 publications
10 citations
1–6 of 4
Venues
- The Review of Economic Studies
1 publications · 234 citations
1
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- The Quarterly Journal of Economics
QJE · 1 publications · 1.3K citations
1
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- Econstor (Econstor)
Repository · 1 publications · 43 citations
1
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- SSRN Electronic Journal
Repository · 1 publications · 10 citations
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