Monotonic Allocation Rules

Monotonic Allocation Rules is a mechanism design criterion belonging to the class of allocation rules, distinguished by the property that an agent’s allocation weakly increases whenever their reported type places them in a more favorable position relative to others, ensuring consistency with dominant-strategy incentive compatibility.

29

Publications

1.2K

Citations

57

Authors

39

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

8

Authors

57

  1. ST
    S.H. Tijs

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    3 publications · 52 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. RB
    R. Brânzei

    Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Romania

    3 publications · 52 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. DM
    Dov Monderer

    Technion – Israel Institute of Technology, Israel

    2 publications · 107 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. GB
    Gustavo Bergantiños

    Universidade de Vigo, Spain

    2 publications · 32 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. HN
    Henk Norde

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    2 publications · 32 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 57

Venues

  1. Social Choice and Welfare

    4 publications · 164 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Games and Economic Behavior

    4 publications · 512 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. Economic Theory

    3 publications · 42 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. International Journal of Game Theory

    2 publications · 43 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. European Journal of Operational Research

    2 publications · 42 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5