Administrative Science Quarterly · 1992 · 268 citations · 18 references
ManagementHuman Resource ManagementOrganizational BehaviorContract TheoryIncentive SystemsLabor EconomicsEmployee Turnover AnalysisPerformance ContractsPerformance-based CompensationPerformance-based PayPerformance-based RewardsPersonnel EconomicsBonus ContractingCompensation Contract DesignContract Incentive DesignHigh-performer TurnoverPerformance-based Pay AnalysisPerformance-based SeveranceWorker Incentives
Todd R. Zenger, Why Do Employers Only Reward Extreme Performance? Examining the Relationships Among Performance, Pay, and Turnover, Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 2, Special Issue: Process and Outcome: Perspectives on the Distribution of Rewards in Organizations (Jun., 1992), pp. 198-219
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Moral Hazard and Observability
Bengt Holmström · The Bell Journal of Economics · 1979 · 8.5K citations
Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms
Edwin P. Hollander, George C. Homans · The American Journal of Psychology · 1963 · 4.7K citations