Bonus Contracting

Bonus Contracting is a compensation mechanism in agency theory where an agent’s payoff is contingent on performance outcomes, distinguished by its use of ex post bonuses to align incentives in the presence of hidden action.

125

Publications

7.7K

Citations

256

Authors

188

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

18

Authors

256

  1. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    4 publications · 702 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. KM
    Klaus M. Schmidt

    Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Germany

    4 publications · 702 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. DD
    Dominique Demougin

    Université du Québec à Montréal, Canada

    3 publications · 80 citations

    3

    h-index

  4. KL
    Kristy L. Towry

    Emory University, United States

    2 publications · 220 citations

    3

    h-index

  5. WJ
    Walter J. Mead

    University of California, Santa Barbara, United States

    2 publications · 95 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 256

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 15 publications · 559 citations

    13

    h-index

  2. The Accounting Review

    9 publications · 624 citations

    10

    h-index

  3. American Economic Review

    4 publications · 633 citations

    4

    h-index

  4. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

    JEMS · 4 publications · 323 citations

    4

    h-index

  5. Management Science

    4 publications · 169 citations

    4

    h-index

1–5