Investigación e innovación en didáctica de las ciencias sociales : historia

References

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	Year	Citations
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure Michael C. Jensen, William H. Meckling Journal of Financial Economics Agency CostsManagerial AspectOwnership StructureFirm PerformanceFirm Theory	1976	69.2K
The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. Stephen A. Ross American Economic Review Canonical Agency ProblemMathematical EconomicsEconomicsFinanceAgent Theory	1973	4.1K
Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Nils H. Hakansson, Kenneth J. Arrow The Journal of Finance EconomicsRisk-taking BehaviorRisk ManagementManagementBusiness	1972	4.1K
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers Gary S. Becker, George J. Stigler The Journal of Legal Studies Public PolicyCriminal Justice SystemLawCriminal LawPunishment	1974	1.9K
Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information Milton Harris, Artur Raviv Journal of Economic Theory Mathematical ProgrammingOptimal Incentive ContractsEconomicsEngineeringIncentive Mechanism	1979	956
Competitive and optimal responses to signals: An analysis of efficiency and distribution Michael Spence Journal of Economic Theory Statistical Signal ProcessingEngineeringChannel Capacity EstimationSystems EngineeringOptimal Responses	1974	727
Medical insurance: A case study of the tradeoff between risk spreading and appropriate incentives Richard Zeckhauser Journal of Economic Theory Health Insurance ReformEconomicsHealth PolicyHealth EconomicsAppropriate Incentives	1970	594
The Economics of Moral Hazard Joseph P. Newhouse, Victor Taylor EconomicsEthical DilemmaMoral HazardBusinessMoral Issue	1969	583
Incentives, Risk , and Information: Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy Joseph E. Stiglitz Columbia Academic Commons (Columbia University)	1975	360

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