2019 · 23 citations · 16 references
Social SciencesEconomicsDecision TheoryGame TheoryIncentive SystemsBayesian GamesIncentive CompatibilityIncentive SchemesMechanism DesignMonetary IncentivesNash EquilibriumBayesian Deep LearningBayesian Incentive CompatibilityBayesian Mechanism DesignIncentive Compatible MechanismsIncentive DesignIncentive MechanismsTrust GamesTrust-based Incentives
An important class of game-theoretic incentive mechanisms for eliciting effort from a crowd are the peer based mechanisms, in which workers are paid by matching their answers with one another. The other classic mechanism is to have the workers solve some gold standard tasks and pay them according to their accuracy on gold tasks. This mechanism ensures stronger incentive compatibility than the peer based mechanisms but assigning gold tasks to all workers becomes inefficient at large scale. We propose a novel mechanism that assigns gold tasks to only a few workers and exploits transitivity to derive accuracy of the rest of the workers from their peers’ accuracy. We show that the resulting mechanism ensures a dominant notion of incentive compatibility and fairness.
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