The RAND Journal of Economics · 2006 · 55 citations · 18 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAgency TheoryContract TheoryLabor EconomicsIncentive SchemesIndividual IncentivesMonetary IncentivesOptimal ContractingPersonnel EconomicsWork IncentivesContract Incentive DesignEmployee IncentivesIncentive ProvisionIncentive-compatible ContractsLabor IncentivesOptimal Incentive ContractsService WorkersWorker Incentives
I study an incentive problem that has been largely ignored in the agency literature: incentives for repeated (human capital) investment. The optimal contract is very simple but still provides rich implications for incentive and wage structures in large organizations. The empirical evidence is presented using personnel records of health insurance claim processors in a large U.S. insurance company. These processors are white‐collar, nonmanagerial, female, service industry workers—a rapidly growing but rarely studied labor group. The empirical findings are consistent with the main features of the optimal contract .
18
Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts
Edward P. Lazear, Sherwin Rosen · Journal of Political Economy · 1981 · 4.6K citations · Full text
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Canice Prendergast · Journal of Economic Literature · 1999 · 3.4K citations
Performance Pay and Productivity
Edward P. Lazear · American Economic Review · 2000 · 2.5K citations
Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory
George P. Baker, Michael C. Jensen, Kevin J. Murphy · The Journal of Finance · 1988 · 1.8K citations · Full text