Économie & prévision · 1990 · 13 citations · 6 references
Social SciencesBusiness EconomicsEconomicsGame TheoryLabor EconomicsMicroeconomicsBargaining TheoryLabor Market DynamicsWage BargainingWage DeterminationWage NegotiationWorkforce SegmentationEmployer-employee BargainingFirm-level BargainingFirm-level Wage BargainingJob ChoiceLabor Market ModelsNegotiation In Wage SettingNon-cooperative GamesWage Offers
Wage Negotiation and the Segmentation of the Job Market, by Pierre Cahuc, Patrick Sevestre, Hélène Zajdela. This paper deals with a model for wage negotiation to explain why the job market is segmented. On the grounds of the non-cooperative games theory, a model is developed. It enables to distinguish different modes of wage setting depending on whether or not wage earners can hope for wages higher than market wages and on whether the firms' performance is good or bad. The model was tested on a sample of 334 French manufacturing firms over the 1974-1983 period. The estimates seem to confirm that both this model and the typology of firms involved therewith are relevant.
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