Management Science · 2012 · 104 citations · 76 references
BusinessLeadershipOrganizational BehaviorBehavioral EconomicsBusiness EthicsEthicsFinancial EthicsOrganizational EthicsEthical Decision-making In AdvisingEthical Dilemmas In WhistleblowingExpectationsHierarchical NormsHierarchyIncentive Compatible MechanismsIncentive-compatible ContractsManagerial Responses To Whistleblowing
We use an incentive-compatible economic experiment and surveys in the field at a large financial services firm to identify the norms for on-the-job behavior among financial advisers and their leaders, and the normative expectations each group has of the other. We examine whistle-blowing on a peer, an incentive clash between serving the client and earning commissions, and a dilemma about fiduciary responsibility to a client. We find patterns of agreement among advisers, among leaders, and between the two groups, that are consistent with company guidelines identified ex ante. However, we also find measurable differences between what leaders expect and the actual norms of advisers. When there is such a mismatch we are able to distinguish miscommunication from ethical disagreement between leaders and advisers. Finally, we show that when advisers' personal ethical opinions do not match group norms, this mismatch is correlated with job dissatisfaction and lying for money in a second experiment. This paper was accepted by Brad Barber, Teck Ho, and Terrance Odean, special issue editors.
76
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1999 · 11.1K citations · Full text
Corporate Social and Financial Performance: A Meta-Analysis
Marc Orlitzky, Frank L. Schmidt, Sara L. Rynes · Organization Studies · 2003 · 7.5K citations
ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition
Gary E. Bolton, Axel Ockenfels · American Economic Review · 2000 · 5.5K citations