American Economic Review · 1997 · 514 citations · 13 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsContract LawAgency TheoryContract TheoryContractsContract DesignContract ManagementIncomplete ContractsInformation AsymmetryOptimal ContractingTransaction Cost EconomicsContract Design Under IncompletenessContract Incomplete-nessIncomplete Contract Theory
Economic agents rarely write optimally complete contracts in the Arrow-Debreu sense. Few regard this as puzzling, since contractual completeness of this kind is often technically infeasible. Our concern here is with the question of why contracts so often leave the contracting parties' obligations incompletely specified; that is, of why they contain "gaps".
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Ronald H. Coase · Economica · 1937 · 23.4K citations · Full text
Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
Oliver Hart, John Moore · Econometrica · 1988 · 1.9K citations
Business, Contract Law, Economics +15