Contract Incomplete-ness

Contract Incomplete-Ness is a theoretical construct in Public-Private Partnership Economics that denotes the inherent limitation of contractual agreements in specifying all future contingencies, governance actions, and performance expectations due to bounded rationality, opportunism, and transaction-specific investments, thereby distinguishing it from complete contracts that assume full foreseeability and enforceability of all terms.

264

Publications

24.7K

Citations

358

Authors

230

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

29

Variants

Contract Incompleteness

Authors

358

  1. OH
    Oliver Hart

    Harvard University, United States

    9 publications · 3.1K citations

    9

    h-index

  2. PB
    Patrick Bolton

    Columbia University, United States

    6 publications · 2.5K citations

    6

    h-index

  3. PA
    Philippe Aghion

    Collège de France, France

    6 publications · 2.7K citations

    6

    h-index

  4. PW
    Patrick W. Schmitz

    University of Cologne, Germany

    6 publications · 159 citations

    6

    h-index

  5. RE
    Robert E. Scott

    Mayo Clinic, United States

    5 publications · 293 citations

    5

    h-index

1–5 of 358

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 34 publications · 932 citations

    18

    h-index

  2. American Economic Review

    14 publications · 3.2K citations

    13

    h-index

  3. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 15 publications · 654 citations

    11

    h-index

  4. The Journal of Law Economics and Organization

    LEO · 10 publications · 1.4K citations

    10

    h-index

  5. eYLS (Yale Law School)

    Repository · 9 publications · 268 citations

    9

    h-index

1–5