The Review of Economic Studies · 1999 · 788 citations · 20 references
BusinessBusiness EconomicsEconomicsAgency TheoryContract TheoryContractsAdverse SelectionIncomplete ContractsInformation AsymmetryMarket FailureMoral HazardTransaction Cost EconomicsContract Design Under IncompletenessContract Incomplete-nessContract Theory Existence TheoremsEx Post BargainingIncomplete Contract TheoryIncomplete Long-term ContractsSituational ContingenciesUnforeseeable Events
We scrutinize the conceptual framework commonly used in the incomplete contract literature. This literature usually assumes that contractual incompleteness is due to the transaction costs of describing—or of even foreseeing—the possible states of nature in advance. We argue, however, that such transaction costs need not interfere with optimal contracting (i.e. transaction costs need not be relevant), provided that agents can probabilistically forecast their possible future payoffs (even if other aspects of the state of the nature cannot be forecast). In other words, all that is required for optimality is that agents be able to perform dynamic programming, an assumption always invoked by the incomplete contract literature. The foregoing optimality result holds very generally provided that parties can commit themselves not to renegotiate. Moreover, we point out that renegotiation may be hard to reconcile with a framework that otherwise presumes perfect rationality. However, even if renegotiation is allowed, the result still remains valid provided that parties are risk averse.
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The Economic Institutions of Capitalism
William M. Dugger · Journal of Economic Issues · 1987 · 15K citations
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Oliver Hart, John Moore · Journal of Political Economy · 1990 · 5.4K citations · Full text
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Oliver Hart · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1995 · 2.9K citations
Business, Contract Law, Economics +12