Intermarket network externalities and competition: An application to the media industry

Jorge Nieto Ferrando, Jean J. Gabszewicz, Didier Laussel, Nathalie Sonnac

International Journal of Economic Theory · 2008 · 37 citations · 25 references

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Concepts

TL;DR

Intermarket network externalities arise when the value of a media product depends on advertising demand, with media consumers’ willingness to pay linked to ad volume and advertisers’ willingness to pay tied to audience size. The study models competition between two rival content providers setting newspaper prices and advertising rates. The authors analyze the resulting game equilibria and examine how they vary with audience attitudes toward advertising. They find that two‑sided interactions can drive a media firm to exit either the advertising market alone or both markets.

Abstract

Intermarket network externalities occur when the utility of a good produced in a given industry varies with the size of the demand for a good produced in another. A particularly significant example of this phenomenon is provided by the interaction between the media and advertising industries. Media consumers vary according to their willingness to pay for a media good, which depends on the advertising volume. In the advertising market, advertisers vary according to their willingness to pay for an advertisement, which also depends positively on the audience reached. We model a situation of competition between two content providers who are rivals in both the media and advertising industries, choosing simultaneously the newspaper prices and the advertising rates. We characterize the equilibria of the game and explore how they depend on audience attitudes towards advertising. Our main finding is that two‐sided interactions may induce exit by one of the media companies from either only the advertising market or both markets.

References

25