Journal of Marketing Research · 1995 · 127 citations · 14 references
LawBusiness EconomicsContract LawContract TheoryContractsFranchise LawContract DesignContract ManagementFranchise AgreementsFranchise ManagementFranchising LawFranchisor ObligationsFranchise Agreement DesignFranchise Agreement EconomicsFranchise Fee NegotiationFranchising RelationshipsFranchisor-franchisee Relationships
The authors use primary data to empirically test several hypotheses about business format franchising on the basis of the theoretical model presented in Lal (1990). They find support for the hypothesis that royalty rate balances the incentives to the franchisor to invest in brand name with those to the franchisees to invest in retail service. Also consistent with the mixed strategy equilibrium, the authors find that royalty rate positively affects monitoring frequency, and that monitoring costs negatively affect service level. However, contrary to the theory, the authors find that monitoring costs inversely affect monitoring frequency among franchisors. They analytically extend Lal's model to incorporate heterogeneity in monitoring costs among franchisees belonging to the same franchisor and find strong empirical support for the hypothesis that monitoring costs inversely affect monitoring frequency within a franchise system.
14
Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
Francine Lafontaine · The RAND Journal of Economics · 1992 · 1.1K citations
The Economics of Franchise Contracts
G. Frank Mathewson, Ralph A. Winter · The Journal of Law and Economics · 1985 · 599 citations