Contractual Wages and the Wage Cushion under Different Bargaining Settings

Ana Rute Cardoso, Pedro Portugal

Journal of Labor Economics · 2005 · 247 citations · 17 references

Concepts

TL;DR

European bargaining systems combine collective bargaining and a national minimum wage with low unemployment and high wage flexibility. The study uses a unique Portuguese dataset of workers, firms, and collective bargaining contracts to analyze determinants of contractual wages and the wage cushion. The wage cushion amplifies the influence of worker and firm characteristics while reducing the impact of union power, allowing firm‑specific arrangements to partially offset collective bargaining and reflecting unions’ egalitarian wage policy.

Abstract

How does a typically European bargaining system, with collective bargaining and national minimum wage, coexist with low unemployment and high wage flexibility? A unique data set on workers, firms, and collective bargaining contracts in Portugal is used to analyze the determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual and actual wages). The results indicate that the wage cushion stretches the returns to worker and firm attributes, whereas it shrinks the returns to union power. Therefore, firm‐specific arrangements partly offset collective bargaining, granting firms certain freedom when setting wages. Contractual wages reflect trade unions' egalitarian policy.

References

17