Industrial and Labor Relations Review · 1990 · 338 citations · 33 references
ManagementBusiness EconomicsPerformance ManagementAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceExecutive CompensationCompensation StrategyDeferred CompensationIncentive CompensationPay-for-performance CompensationPerformance-based CompensationPerformance-based PayExecutive Compensation Decisions
The author, using 1981–86 data on more than 16,000 managers at 250 large corporations, investigates whether the sensitivity of managerial compensation to corporate performance in one year is positively related to corporate performance in the next year. Accounting-based measures of performance yield only weak evidence of such an association, but economic and market measures yield stronger evidence. Payment of an incremental 10% bonus for good economic performance is associated with a 30 to 90 basis point increase in the expected after-tax gross economic return in the following fiscal year; and payment of an incremental raise of 10% following a good stock market performance is associated with a 400 to 1200 basis point increase in expected total shareholder return.
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