Signaling Contracts

Signaling Contracts is a contractual framework in which one party credibly conveys private information to another through the strategic design of contract terms, thereby distinguishing itself from other contracting mechanisms by enabling informed decision-making under asymmetric information.

36

Publications

3.2K

Citations

67

Authors

47

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

5

Authors

67

  1. YI
    Younghwan In

    National University of Singapore, Singapore

    2 publications · 52 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. JW
    Julian Wright

    National University of Singapore, Singapore

    2 publications · 52 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. TM
    Tamilla Mavlanova

    Baruch College, United States

    1 publications · 426 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. CH
    Chad Hogan

    University of Michigan, United States

    1 publications · 69 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. DT
    Danko Turcic

    Washington University in St. Louis, United States

    1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 67

Venues

  1. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 3 publications · 48 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. Management Science

    3 publications · 325 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. Econometrica

    2 publications · 316 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 2 publications · 38 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Journal of Labor Economics

    JOLE · 2 publications · 338 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5