Retaliation Mechanisms

Retaliation Mechanisms is a theoretical construct in antitrust economics that identifies the capacity of firms in an oligopolistic market to deter competitive deviations by imposing coordinated punitive responses, distinguishing it from unilateral strategic behavior through its reliance on interdependent, self-enforcing sanctions.

60

Publications

5K

Citations

96

Authors

64

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

8

Authors

96

  1. AO
    Alan O. Sykes

    University of Chicago, United States

    4 publications · 445 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. JM
    John McMillan

    University of California San Diego, United States

    3 publications · 335 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. YG
    Yany Grégoire

    HEC Montréal, Canada

    2 publications · 903 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. EF
    Ernst Fehr

    University of Zurich, Switzerland

    2 publications · 524 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. WF
    Warren F. Schwartz

    Georgetown University, United States

    2 publications · 413 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 96

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 3 publications · 271 citations

    3

    h-index

  2. World Trade Review

    3 publications · 76 citations

    3

    h-index

  3. The Review of Economic Studies

    2 publications · 737 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. RePEc: Research Papers in Economics

    Repository · 2 publications · 52 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. Public Choice

    1 publications · 42 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5