Concepedia

Coordinated Effects

Coordinated Effects is a theory of anticompetitive harm in merger control in which a transaction increases the likelihood, stability, or effectiveness of coordinated interaction—whether tacit or explicit—among two or more firms in the relevant market, thereby enabling them jointly to exercise market power beyond what any firm could profitably achieve unilaterally.

22

Publications

649

Citations

33

Authors

23

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

7

Parents

Children

Publications

22

Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms

Iwan Bos, Joseph E. Harrington · The RAND Journal of Economics · 2010 · 138 citations

, , +6

Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects under the Antitrust Laws

Jonathan B. Baker · eYLS (Yale Law School) · 2008 · 62 citations · Full text

, , +10

Measuring the Incentive to Collude: The Vitamin Cartels, 1990–99

Mitsuru Igami, Takuo Sugaya · The Review of Economic Studies · 2021 · 56 citations

, , +10

Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition

Patrick Rey, Jean Tirole · Journal of Political Economy · 2018 · 44 citations

, , +14

Coherent reaction

Jonathan Edwards · 2009 · 39 citations

, , +9

1–5 of 22

Authors

33

  1. TS
    Takuo Sugaya

    Stanford University, United States

    2 publications · 78 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. MI
    Mitsuru Igami

    Yale University, United States

    2 publications · 78 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. JB
    Jonathan B. Baker

    American University, United States

    2 publications · 75 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. MO
    Matthew Olczak

    University of East Anglia, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 35 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. SD
    Stephen Davies

    University of Auckland, New Zealand

    2 publications · 26 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 33

Institutions

23

  1. University of East Anglia

    Norwich, United Kingdom

    3 h-index

    6 publications

    113 citations

  2. Universidade do Porto

    Porto, Portugal

    2 h-index

    3 publications

    35 citations

  3. Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse

    Toulouse, France

    1 h-index

    1 publications

    44 citations

  4. Universidade Nova de Lisboa

    Lisbon, Portugal

    1 h-index

    1 publications

    11 citations

  5. Washington College

    Chestertown, United States

    1 h-index

    1 publications

    13 citations

  6. Duke University

    Durham, United States

    1 h-index

    1 publications

    12 citations

  7. American University

    Washington, United States

    1 h-index

    1 publications

    13 citations

  8. University of Michigan

    Ann Arbor, United States

    1 h-index

    1 publications

    24 citations

1–8 of 23

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 5 publications · 90 citations

    5

    h-index

  2. The Journal of Law and Economics

    JLE · 2 publications · 27 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. The RAND Journal of Economics

    1 publications · 138 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies

    JELS · 1 publications · 22 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Journal of Political Economy

    JPE · 1 publications · 44 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5