Entry Deterrence

Entry Deterrence is a strategic behavior employed by incumbent firms within an industry to prevent potential competitors from entering the market by credibly raising the perceived costs or risks of entry.

727

Publications

63.4K

Citations

1.1K

Authors

569

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

93

Authors

1.1K

  1. FK
    Fahri Karakaya

    University of Massachusetts Dartmouth, United States

    8 publications · 511 citations

    8

    h-index

  2. EV
    Eliana Viviano

    Bank of Italy, Italy

    6 publications · 829 citations

    6

    h-index

  3. PM
    Peter M. Kort

    Tilburg University, Netherlands

    6 publications · 150 citations

    6

    h-index

  4. AB
    Andrea Bassanini

    Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Economiques, France

    5 publications · 131 citations

    5

    h-index

  5. MB
    Marvin B. Lieberman

    University of California, Los Angeles, United States

    4 publications · 4.1K citations

    4

    h-index

1–5 of 1.1K

Venues

  1. SSRN Electronic Journal

    Repository · 64 publications · 2.3K citations

    28

    h-index

  2. Strategic Management Journal

    SMJ · 26 publications · 6.5K citations

    23

    h-index

  3. The RAND Journal of Economics

    29 publications · 1.9K citations

    22

    h-index

  4. Journal of Industrial Economics

    25 publications · 1.6K citations

    19

    h-index

  5. 17

    h-index

1–5