Deterrence Equilibrium

Deterrence Equilibrium is a game-theoretic equilibrium in which a monopolist's strategic behavior induces a potential entrant to refrain from entering the market, thereby maintaining the status quo through credible threats or capacity investments that make entry unprofitable.

19

Publications

881

Citations

34

Authors

31

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

1

Authors

34

  1. DM
    D. Marc Kilgour

    Wilfrid Laurier University, Canada

    4 publications · 242 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. FC
    Frank C. Zagare

    University at Buffalo, State University of New York, United States

    4 publications · 264 citations

    4

    h-index

  3. IB
    Iris Bohnet

    Harvard University, United States

    2 publications · 83 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. RD
    Robert D. Cooter

    University of California, Berkeley, United States

    2 publications · 83 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. LS
    Lambert Schoonbeek

    University of Groningen, Netherlands

    1 publications · 23 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5 of 34

Venues

  1. International Studies Quarterly

    2 publications · 162 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. Information Systems Frontiers

    1 publications · 31 citations

    1

    h-index

  3. Journal of Banking & Finance

    1 publications · 25 citations

    1

    h-index

  4. The RAND Journal of Economics

    1 publications · 176 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. American Journal of Political Science

    AJPS · 1 publications · 82 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5