Deterrence Equilibrium
Deterrence Equilibrium is a game-theoretic equilibrium in which a monopolist's strategic behavior induces a potential entrant to refrain from entering the market, thereby maintaining the status quo through credible threats or capacity investments that make entry unprofitable.
19
Publications
881
Citations
34
Authors
31
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
1
Parents
19
Frank C. Zagare, D. Marc Kilgour · International Studies Quarterly · 1993 · 123 citations
Credibility, Uncertainty, and Deterrence
D. Marc Kilgour, Frank C. Zagare · American Journal of Political Science · 1991 · 82 citations
Social Sciences, Economics, Strategy +17
Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?
Iris Bohnet, Robert D. Cooter · SSRN Electronic Journal · 2003 · 66 citations · Full text
1–5 of 19
34
4
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University at Buffalo, State University of New York, United States
4 publications · 264 citations
4
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2
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2
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1
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1–5 of 34
31

Wilfrid Laurier University
Waterloo, Canada
3 h-index
3 publications
160 citations
Center for Interuniversity Research and Analysis on Organizations
Montreal, Canada
1 h-index
2 publications
134 citations
KU Leuven
Leuven, Belgium
1 h-index
1 publications
15 citations

Université Laval
Québec, Canada
1 h-index
2 publications
134 citations
Columbia University
New York, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
25 citations

University of Namur
Namur, Belgium
1 h-index
1 publications
15 citations

Morningside College
Sioux City, United States
1 h-index
1 publications
25 citations

University of Groningen
Groningen, The Netherlands
1 h-index
1 publications
23 citations
1–8 of 31
2 publications · 162 citations
2
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1 publications · 31 citations
1
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1 publications · 25 citations
1
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1 publications · 176 citations
1
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AJPS · 1 publications · 82 citations
1
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1–5