Eisenhower and US Grand Strategy

Abstract

Abstract: Dwight D. Eisenhower infused deliberate planning processes into US grand strategy. Due to lack of consensus regarding how to address the Soviet threat, Eisenhower directed the formation of a six-week exercise (Solarium) to study three alternative strategies. Upon completion of the exercise, the National Security Council crafted the Basic National Security Policy over a period of three months, reviewing it annually and revising it as the international security environment changed. ********** As remarkable as it may seem, the only time the United States has had a formal grand strategy was during the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration. While some might scoff, recalling the National Security Council Report (NSC) 68, Flexible Response as implemented by President John F. Kennedy, and a host of other doctrines associated with presidents, none of these came close to assessing the strategic environment, developing and vetting various strategic options, and articulating an overarching strategic concept that promoted and protected US interests in a purposeful manner. A product of the US Army's deliberative planning process, President Dwight D. Eisenhower brought a wealth of executive experience, organizational skill, and knowledge of strategy development to the White House. His first fundamental task as president was to design a National Security Council system to serve his leadership and management style needs. Once the NSC mechanism began to function in March 1953, Eisenhower had a system that provided him and the NSC with integrated staff work, education on the issues, and meaningful debate--all of which cultivated strategic thinking. development of the Basic National Security Policy (BNSP) was a much more involved process than many consider. It began with a six-week exercise (the Solarium Project), studying alternative policies to counter the Soviet objective of world domination. Upon completion of the exercise, the real work began with the NSC Planning Board and NSC Staff providing drafts over the next three months for NSC discussion. final product was NSC 162/2--the BNSP. Contrary to popular speculation at the time, the BNSP continued to evolve throughout the Eisenhower administration as the strategic environment changed. final section of this article explores some of the mischaracterizations and realities associated with the BNSP. Project Solarium While the Eisenhower Administration immediately began work on a national security policy (NSC 149/2, 29 April 1953), consensus remained elusive. (1) Of course, similar divisions over national security policy had erupted in the Truman Administration, but Eisenhower initially thought he could avoid this recurrence through NSC deliberations. (2) Still, fundamental differences remained. For example, while Eisenhower was in general agreement with Truman's containment strategy as reflected in NSC 149/2, Secretary of State Foster Dulles was dissatisfied with it, urging a more aggressive policy to contract Soviet power and influence; Republican congressmen opposed it because it implied a large defense budget; others wanted even greater defense expenditures to challenge the Soviet threat directly. (3) problem was not just a matter of consensus; other factors warranted a more comprehensive review of national security policy as well. death of Stalin in March 1953 created uncertainties pursuant to Soviet designs, especially after the Kremlin's rebuff of Eisenhower's The Chance for Peace speech on 16 April 1953. Korean War continued with no diplomatic breakthrough in sight. autocratic, populist governments in Iran, Guatemala, and Egypt were candidates for Soviet opportunism. And at this stage of the Cold War, the advance of the Communist bloc appeared to be gaining momentum. Clearly, the United States needed to address these emerging national security challenges through a deliberative process. …